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SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR LAW

INTRODUCTION
DONALD W. HOAGLAND
of the Denver Bar

On March 28, 1953, a highly successful one-day institute on
labor law was held in Denver under the auspices of the Denver
Bar Association. It dealt almost entirely with the substantive aspects of unfair practices by labor organizations and by employers.
The three articles which follow are largely derived from lectures
that were delivered on that occasion and deal, respectively, with
unfair labor practices by employers, unfair labor practices by
labor organizations and secondary boycotts. These will present
in some detail the substantive legal limitations on the efforts of
management and of labor organizations to reach objectives which
can usually be gained only at the expense of some objective of
the other.
Of necessity these articles will omit large segments of the
general subject of labor-management relations, some of which are
easily separable but others of which are so closely related that
some mention of them at this point should provide useful background for the reading of the articles. In effect, the articles discuss the potential abuses of, and interferences with, the employee's
right to bargain freely with his employer through agents of his
own choosing. This omits any discussion of how this right was
acquired, and of how it is exercised in the absence of abuse or
interference.
From the birth of the first recognizable labor organization in
this country in 1827, until 1890, organized labor conducted a
series of experiments in technique which was regulated only by
judges applying common law methods to reach their results. It
is a familiar story that labor organizations were first viewed by
them as unlawful conspiracies. The first break in this attitude
occured in 1842, when a Massachusetts court held that Union
organizations were not illegal per se, but that their activities
must be examined on their merits. For fifty years the process of
examining their activities on their merits continued in the hands
of common law judges, and most labor partisans believed that
the movement fared very badly.
The first legislation of significance occurred near the turn of
the century. By an odd quirk of fate, statutes were passed in
1888 and in 1890 which stand, respectively, as the starting points
for two diametrically opposed lines of policy. In 1888 the Federal
Arbitration Act was passed in an effort to provide machinery for
the peaceful settlements of disputes in the railroad industry. This
machinery is the parent in legislative form of the National Labor
Relations Board. In 1890 the Sherman Act, which is rarely asso-
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ciated now with labor legislation, was passed, and provided the
opponents of the great Pullman strike four years later with a
powerful anti-union weapon. This was a bitter period, and some
of its bitterest episodes occurred in Cripple Creek, Leadville, Telluride, Victor and Independence, Colorado.
The next important development occurred in 1914. The use
of the Sherman Act against organized labor was bitterly opposed
by labor supporters, and in 1914 provisions were inserted in the
Clayton Act which were designed to eliminate Sherman Act injunctions against organized labor activities. The experience of
the railroad industry, starting from the Arbitration Act, was
producing new legislation and after several intermediate steps,
in 1926 the Railway Labor Act was passed, containing the announcement that employees subject to the Act had the right to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice.
The Act also provided for boards of adjustment and mediation;
its application was still limited, of course, to railroad employees.
Most labor leaders concluded that the actual gains produced
by these changes were insignificant. The Clayton Act was a great
disappointment to them, since the courts continued to assert jurisdiction over requests for injunctions based on the assertion that
irreparable harm to persons or property was threatened. Labor
turned more and more to the use of economic weapons and away
from substantive legislative action on the terms and conditions
of employment. By the early 1930's. the objective of labor appeared to be to clear the arena of all competing forces except
labor and management; to stay the hands of Federal judges and
to impose the minimum of regulation over the test of strength
between unions and management. The first important legislation
in this direction came in 1932. The Norris-LaGuardia Act in that
year removed jurisdiction from the Federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes except under special circumstances.
It extended protection to union activities by denying federal courts
the power to enjoin strikes, assemblies, efforts to publicize the
facts of the labor dispute and the very joining of union.
This was largely a negative measure, however, and in 1933
the first positive legislation of general application designed to
bring labor and management together at the bargaining table on
equal terms and with as little interference as possible, made its
appearance. This was contained in a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act (Section 7A) which adopted the approach
of the Railway Labor Act and extended to all employees subject
to the Act the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice. The National Industrial Recovery Act
also adopted another Railway Labor Act device, namely, the labor
board. It established the National Labor Board which was intended to insure that the provisions of the Act were carried out
much as the National Railway Adjustment Board presided over
the enforcement of the rights of railroad employees under the
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Railway Labor Act. The NIRA, and the related Public Resolution No. 44, did not last very long, but within two months of the
declaration by the Supreme Court that NIRA was unconstitutional, the Congress passed, in July of 1935, the National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act.
Although the constitutionality of this Act, which purported
to re'ach all employees whose labor disputes might affect commerce among the states, was in doubt until April of 1937, its
passage marks a key point in the acquisition by organized labor
of freedom to exert its economic power in bargaining with employers. There has never been any doubt about the potential economic power of organized labor; the overriding question has
always been how freely should it be permitted to be used. Nineteen thirty-five and the Wagner Act marked the high point of
labor's freedom to operate with a minimum of restraint.
There has, of course, never been unanimous feeling among
all groups in America that organized labor should be free to
operate without restriction. During the period 1935 to 1947, a
sufficient segment of the American public became convinced that
unions were operating with too little restraint that in 1947 a
strenuous revision of the National Labor Relations Act was undertaken, and the resulting law incorporated for the first time a
series of what are known as unfair labor practices by employees;
these, of course, are restrictions upon the freedom of organized
labor to use certain techniques labelled unfair in the test of
strength against management. As amended to date, the National
Labor Relations Act (which includes the Taft-Hartley LaborManagement Relations Act) states the substantive rules which
the three articles to follow will explain in detail. Whether they
represent the first stopping point on a reverse swing of the pendulum which is said to have swung in favor of labor to an increasingly dangerous extent for 30 years, or whether they constitute,
as many labor politicians during the 1952 political campaign announced they did, a "slave labor law", is a matter of individual
political choice.
A less controversial aspect of the subject, but an equally important one, is the matter of procedure. Now that organized labor
has acquired these rights, how are they exercised? The development of the National Labor Relations Board which the Wagner
Act created has been a controversial subject only in connection
with the policies pursued by the Board. There is little question
but that some such agency should be present in the labor-management relations picture to deal with abuses and interferences
by either party. Apart from its policies on such substantive matters, the manner in which it operates, its structure and administration, form the essential background and apparatus for the
performances of the principal parties to labor-management relations.
The beginning of all of the many potential contacts between
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organized labor and management is the organizing drive. The
National Labor Relations Board comes into this picture immediately, because it is the objective of labor organizations to become
recognized- and certified by the NLRB as the bargaining agent
for employee unit. Whenever an employer whose plant is unorganized is informed that a substantial number of his employees
desire to be represented by a bargaining agent, the employer
must either agree to bargain with the named agent (if he has no
question that the agent is in fact supported by the majority of
his employees) or he must submit the matter (or fequest that
it be submitted) to the National Labor Relations Board.
The Board (or the Regional Director) will either hold an
election or investigate the propriety of an election if a question
is raised as to its jurisdiction. There are three questions that
must be decided before an election can be held, and the Board
can decide them all. It must be determined that the employees
in question are subject to the Act, that a substantial number of
employees support the request for an election, and that the unit
for which an election is to be held is an appropriate unit for
bargaining purposes. The Board will decide these questions subject to judicial review. The first and third of them raise innumerable possibilities for disagreement and, particularly on the unit
question, the Board has broad discretion. Assuming that the necessary relation to commerce exists, and that the Board finds that
the proposed unit is appropriate, the members of the proposed
unit will be identified and an election held.
Agents of the Board will work closely on the scene with
management and union representatives to insure that each employee registers his private choice in the matter of union representation without interference. If a- majority of the employees
voting select the same representative, he will be certified as such.
If no majority opinion is found, run-off elections are held in which
"no-union" may be a candidate, depending on the number of votes
cast for that result in the election which failed to produce any
majority. Elections are decided by a majority of votes cast, but
no result will stand unless the Board feels that a sufficient number of members of the unit have voted.
This bare outline indicates not only how representation is
determined in the simplest cases, but also indicates the dominant
influence of the NLRB and its agents even in matters where no
abuse or interference prohibited by law is present, charged or
suspected. Against this outline, and during the operation of this
procedure and its ramifications the substantive rules elaborated
in the following articles operate.
This subject has always deserved attention and always will,
but it is particularly timely now because the Congress of the
United States is presently considering why and how it would
change the National Labor Relations Act to reflect the views of
a changed administration.

